INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of national trauma, states often turn to reconciliation as a tool for rebuilding fractured societies. Yet the question remains: can a nation truly heal without confronting justice?

In 1970, Nigeria emerged from a devastating civil war with a promise of “No Victor, No Vanquished,” launching General Yakubu Gowon’s 3Rs, Reconstruction, Rehabilitation, and Reconciliation, as a framework for national unity. Across the continent, post-apartheid South Africa, under Nelson Mandela’s presidency, instituted the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), a more structured effort aimed at documenting abuses done during the apartheid system, and granting conditional amnesty.

Both initiatives were responses to deep national wounds, but their approaches to justice differed significantly. This article compares the intent, structure, and outcomes of these two landmark reconciliation models, asking whether national unity built on silence or selective memory can ever be sustainable.

BACKGROUND

The Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970), often referred to as the Biafran War, was one of the most devastating chapters in Nigeria’s history. It erupted just seven years after the country gained independence from Britain and was rooted in deep-seated political, ethnic, and economic tensions.

Following a series of military coups and counter-coups between 1966 and 1967, including the killing of key political figures and the eventual assassination of Nigeria’s first military Head of State, General Aguiyi Ironsi, tensions in the country worsened. The situation escalated further with the mass killing of thousands of Igbos and other Easterners living in Northern Nigeria. In response, the Eastern Region, under the leadership of Lt. Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, declared independence of the southeastern region from Nigeria, which became the Republic of Biafra in May 1967.

What followed was a brutal 30-month civil war between the federal government and Biafran forces. The war claimed over a million lives, many of them children, largely due to starvation caused by the federal government's economic and food blockade of the Biafran territory.

When the war ended in January 1970, Nigeria was not the same. Homes were lost. Families were divided. Communities were shattered. But surprisingly, the federal government under General Yakubu Gowon did not adopt a punitive approach. Instead, Gowon took the podium and declared that there was “No Victor, No Vanquished.” This statement was symbolic, an attempt to ease tensions, foster reconciliation, and begin the process of rebuilding a fractured nation.

To operationalize this vision, Gowon introduced what became known as the 3Rs policy:

Reconstruction: Repairing the physical infrastructure damaged by the war. This includes, roads, schools, hospitals, and public services, especially in the former Biafran region.

Rehabilitation: Providing support for displaced persons, war returnees, and soldiers who had fought on both sides of the war.

Reconciliation: Mending the social fabric and encouraging unity across Nigeria’s ethnic and regional lines. An attempt to restore trust, and reintegrate former Biafrans into national life.

Also, in South Africa, the roots of racial division stretch far back before the official policy of apartheid began in 1948. European settlement started in the mid-17th century when Dutch settlers, later known as Boers or Afrikaners, established a colony at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652.

Over time, the British also gained control of the region, leading to tensions between the British and the Boers, which culminated in the Anglo-Boer Wars (1880–1881 and 1899–1902). Despite their differences, both white groups maintained dominance over the Black majority population.

Following the creation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, which was a dominion under British control, a series of laws increasingly marginalized Black South Africans. Land Acts, pass laws, and segregated education systems, all laid the groundwork for racial inequality long before apartheid became a formal state policy.

In 1948, the National Party came to power and codified these practices into a full system of apartheid. This was a rigid, legal framework of racial segregation. Under this regime, Black South Africans were stripped of political rights, forcibly removed from their lands, and confined to underdeveloped homelands and townships. They were denied access to quality education, healthcare, and employment.

The African National Congress (ANC), a political party formed in 1912 to advocate for the rights of black South Africans under colonial and later apartheid rule, as well as other liberation movements, resisted the regime for years, often facing brutal state repression. Leaders like Nelson Mandela were imprisoned for decades.

By the early 1990s, a combination of internal resistance, international sanctions, and economic pressures pushed the apartheid government to the negotiating table. In 1994, South Africa held its first democratic elections, leading to the election of Nelson Mandela as president.

Nelson Mandela, was one of the most prominent leaders of the African National Congress (ANC). He was arrested in 1962 for his role in organizing anti-apartheid activities, including sabotage against the apartheid government. He was sentenced to life imprisonment and went on to spend 27 years behind bars, and was finally released in 1990 amid increasing local and international pressure to end apartheid.

As part of the country’s healing process, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established in 1995 under Mandela’s leadership. It aimed to investigate human rights violations committed during apartheid, promote national unity, and offer a platform for both victims and perpetrators to tell their stories. Rather than retribution, the TRC emphasized restorative justice, which is a bold attempt to confront the past without descending into cycles of revenge.

HOW EACH RECONCILIATION MODEL WAS STRUCTURED

Structurally, the two post-conflict responses couldn’t be more different. In Nigeria, there was no formal commission or institutional framework established to guide the implementation of the 3Rs. Rather, the policy operated as a broad political directive issued by General Yakubu Gowon after Biafra's surrender in January 1970. It lacked a defined administrative body, and legal mechanisms, for equitable reconstruction or justice.

Reconstruction efforts were often skewed, and rehabilitation programs were limited. Most notably, is the treatment of former Biafran soldiers and the reintegration of displaced populations. The federal government's decision to give all Biafrans only £20 regardless of pre-war savings further reflected the absence of structured inclusion.

There was no national dialogue, no mechanism for victims to share their experiences, and no space for perpetrators of war crimes to be held accountable or heard. The silence was meant to preserve national unity, but it often felt like erasure, especially to those from the Eastern Region.

South Africa, in contrast, designed its response with a formal, legal, and highly visible structure. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established in 1995 by the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, passed under Nelson Mandela’s presidency. It was composed of several committees, including the Amnesty Committee, Human Rights Violations Committee, and the Reparations and Rehabilitation Committee. It operated with a clear mandate: to investigate gross human rights violations that occurred between 1960 and 1994 under apartheid. The process was highly inclusive. Victims came forward to tell their stories, often in emotional public hearings, and perpetrators could apply for amnesty, but only if they provided full disclosure of their actions and could prove political motivation. For example, Eugene de Kock, notoriously known as “Prime Evil,” was the commander of the apartheid-era Vlakplaas death squad. It was responsible for multiple assassinations and torture of ANC activists. He was granted TRC amnesty for politically motivated crimes, including the bombing of ANC offices in London and targeted killings of ANC members, after fully disclosing his actions and their motivations to the Amnesty Committee (iol.co.za and iol.co.za).

The hearings were broadcast on radio and television, engaging the entire nation. The TRC created a national conversation and allowed for individual healing through public acknowledgement, even if justice, in the form of punishment, was often traded for truth.

SHORTCOMINGS OF THE 3RS POLICY

Despite its well-intentioned premise, General Gowon’s 3Rs initiative failed to achieve its stated goals of rebuilding the nation and healing wartime divisions:

1. Failure to Deliver on Reconstruction and Rehabilitation

According to the Guardian newspaper 2017, Many Eastern communities remained in ruins decades after the civil war. Schools, roads, and hospitals were either never rebuilt or abandoned. The absence of targeted social services, like mass literacy programs or trauma support left returning communities without meaningful assistance or psychological care.

2. Economic Disempowerment of Eastern Nigerians

The infamous "£20 policy" wiped out pre-war savings—each Eastern Nigerian received only £20 regardless of prior balance. This not only deepened poverty but also eroded trust. Communities were stripped of resources while their properties were seized under abandoned-property laws.

3. Absence of Reconciliation Mechanisms

The “R” in reconciliation remained rhetorical. There were no truth commissions, public forums, or avenues for victims and former fighters to share experiences or seek redress. Without these spaces, collective healing was stunted and grievances festered in silence .

4. Root Cause of Renewed Separatism

Experts attribute the rise of movements like MASSOB and IPOB to the failure of the post-war policy. These groups argue that the neglected promises of reconstruction and reconciliation fueled a sense of marginalization and historical betrayal.

SHORTCOMINGS OF THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

In South Africa, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was praised for its moral ambition and transparency. By prioritizing truth-telling over retribution, it helped the nation confront the horrors of apartheid without descending into chaos (Tutu, 1999; Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, 1998).

The public hearings gave victims a voice and allowed perpetrators a path to amnesty, if they offered full disclosure and proved political motivation. This approach encouraged national dialogue and set a global precedent for restorative justice.

However, the TRC’s major shortcoming was its limited legal power to enforce compensation or prosecute unrepentant offenders. Many victims received no reparations, and some perpetrators walked free despite causing irreversible harm. Critics argue that while the TRC revealed the truth, it failed to deliver justice in any tangible form. As a result, deep economic and social inequalities rooted in apartheid persist today, leading some to describe the process as symbolic healing rather than structural change.

FROM RECONCILIATION TO RESISTANCE

The shortcomings of Gowon’s post-war Reconciliation policy did not merely end with silence, they planted seeds of resentment that have since matured into organized resistance, most notably the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB). Led by Nnamdi Kanu, IPOB did not just call for secession, it tapped into a long-standing sense of betrayal that dated back to 1970. The group built its identity around the narrative that Biafra was never truly defeated; rather, its struggle was suspended and now reawakened by the continued marginalization of Eastern Nigerians.

By 2025, IPOB’s activities, including enforced sit-at-home orders, civil disobedience campaigns, and open clashes with the military, have turned Southeast Nigeria into a zone of persistent unrest. According to reports by SBM Intelligence via Reuters, over 700 deaths have occurred in the region as a direct result of IPOB-related conflict. These tensions are not merely political but deeply historical, shaped by the failure of reconciliation to acknowledge past traumas.

Furthermore, many in the Southeast believe they are treated as a defeated region rather than a fully reintegrated part of the Nigerian project. During the 2023 elections, these tensions played out visibly, as suspicions around Peter Obi’s candidacy revealed a deep national unease with the idea of Igbo leadership, further confirming that Nigeria's post-war wounds are far from healed.

In South Africa, the TRC established a moral archive of apartheid-era abuses, giving voice to both victims and guilty officials. Although it offered symbolic healing, economic and racial inequalities persisted in post-apartheid society. A 1998 survey found many victims felt the process favored perpetrators and failed to deliver justice (Centre for the Study of Violence & Reconciliation, cited via Wikipedia).

The aspirational “Rainbow Nation” ideal, coined by Archbishop Desmond Tutu and popularized by Mandela promised racial harmony but struggled to erase deeply rooted poverty, land inequality, and unemployment among Black South Africans.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

At their core, Nigeria’s 3Rs and South Africa’s TRC represent two divergent philosophies of nation-building: silence versus confrontation. The 3Rs sought unity by avoiding blame. There were no trials, no public reckoning. However, without justice or truth, wounds remained buried and resentment grew. The result: a revived ethnic agitation decades later.

South Africa, on the other hand, confronted apartheid head-on. Its TRC combined truth with conditional amnesty, allowing healing via confession rather than silence. Yet critics warn that without financial reparations or criminal accountability, reconciliation became symbolic, and was limited to memory, not structural reform.

So, can a nation heal without justice? Nigeria’s experience suggests the answer is no. Without truth, reconstruction felt hollow. South Africa shows reconciliation may begin with truth, but without economic justice, racial inequality remains stubborn, and unity remains incomplete.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, both South Africa and Nigeria sought to move beyond violent pasts. South Africa, through the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, chose visibility, although imperfect, while Nigeria leaned on a rhetoric of "no victor, no vanquished" to suppress the pain of war.

But in truth, Biafra lost the war, and Nigeria won. And that should have marked a clear path forward, not of shame or retribution, but of honest rebuilding.

Instead, the Nigerian state offered the illusion of reintegration. Gowon’s 3Rs became a hollow doctrine: reconstruction was incomplete, rehabilitation was selective, and reconciliation stopped at slogans. In many ways, it might have been better to clearly accept the role of victor and allow the defeated space to grieve and heal. But by dangling promises of unity and then failing to fulfill them, the state deepened wounds it claimed to mend. Today, those wounds remain open, with the resurgence of Biafran sentiment through IPOB.

For future reconciliation efforts in Africa and beyond, both cases show that national unity cannot simply be declared. It must be earned through truth-telling, inclusion, and meaningful repair.