Immanuel Kant's Morality

Self-ImprovementLeadership

  • Author Odianosen Lucky Ehichoya
  • Published March 30, 2025
  • Word count 7,318

IMMANUEL KANT’S MORALITY

3.1 Immanuel Kant’s biography

The year 1724 was not one of the most significant years in the history of the human race, but it was not wholly insignificant either. It saw the signing of a treaty between Moscow and Constantinople, designed to dismember Persia, whose territory the two powers had previously invaded. Persia’s Shah Mahmoud went insane and ordered a wholesale massacre at Isfahan. Claude Buffier published his Traité des vérités premières et de la source de nos jugements (Treatise on First Truths and on the Source of Our Judgments), trying to uncover the basic principles of human knowledge, while David Hume was beginning his second year of study at the University of Edinburgh.

In Prussia, Frederick William I (1688–1740), who ruled from 1713, was hard at work, trying to centralize the state, and to amass an impressive army with the revenue from an impoverished country. During the previous year he had taken a decisive step to reform his administration, unifying it into a single board, which was known as the general directory. This institution was to become an efficient bureaucracy that cut royal expenditures while more than doubling annual income, allowing him to channel funds to his army. During 1723 he had also found time to expel Christian Wolff from all of Prussia at the behest of religious zealots, known as Pietists, in Halle.

They had argued that Wolff’s acceptance of the Leibnizian theory of pre-established harmony implied fatalism and could serve as an excuse for deserters from the army. Indeed, it might persuade them to desert. One of his first actions consisted in the removal from the University of Königsberg of the most outspoken advocate of Wolffian philosophy. Christian Gabriel Fischer (1686–1751), professor of natural philosophy, met with the same fate as Wolff because Rogall informed on him in Berlin.

On April 22 of this year Immanuel Kant was born in Königsberg. The Old Prussian Almanac associated the name “Emanuel” with this date. Accordingly, he was baptized “Emanuel.” He would later change it to “Immanuel,” thinking that this was a more faithful rendition of the original Hebrew. “Emanuel” or “Immanuel” means “God is with him.” Kant thought that it was a most appropriate name, and he was uncommonly proud of it, commenting on its meaning even in his old age. It is perhaps meaningful that he found it necessary critically to evaluate and correct the very name given to him, but it is noteworthy that the literal meaning of his name provided him with comfort and confidence throughout his life. Indeed, Kant’s autonomous, self-reliant, and self-made character may well presuppose a certain kind of optimistic trust in the world as a teleological whole, a world in which everything, himself included, had a definite place.

Immanuel was the son of Johann Georg Kant (1683–1746), a master harness malter in Königsberg, and Anna Regina Kant (1697–1737), nee Reuter, the daughter of another harness malter in Königsberg. Johann Georg Kant had come to Königsberg from Tilsit. His marriage to Anna Regina on November 13, 1715, opened the way for him to make a living as an independent tradesman. Such craftsmen had to belong to a guild. Since the guilds strictly regulated the numbers of those who could open a business with in a city, marriage to a master’s daughter was often the only way for someone from the outside to break into the trade. One became an independent master tradesman in one of only two ways: either by being born a master’s son or by marrying a master’s daughter. Anna Regina herself was the daughter of Caspar Reuter and his wife Regina, nee Felgenhauer (or Falkenhauer). Caspar Reuter had also come from outside the city, namely from Nürmberg, which had old trade connections with Königsberg.

Working largely with leather, the harness makers were closely related to the shoemakers and saddle makers. The harness makers (Riemer or courroiers) produced harnesses for horses, carriages, and sleds as well as other implements having to do with transportation. In Prussia they also were responsible for the outfitting of the carriages themselves. The main material they worked with was leather, and the most important implements of their trade were similar to those of the saddle makers. Kant’s father, like most tradesmen, had his workshop at home. While the harness makers were not among the most prestigious of the guilds, they were part of the system. A member of this class, the Kant’s may not have been rich, but they certainly had a certain kind of social standing that demanded respect, and they took pride in their honor. Kant, as the son of a master, had special rights, since he was a member of the guild by birth.

The family first lived in a house located in the outer city, which had once belonged to the stepfather of Regina Reuter, Kant’s grandmother. It seems to have been inherited by Kant’s grandparents, and it was owned by them rather than by his parents. The house stood on a narrow but deep lot. It was typical for Königsberg – three stories high. There was a shed, a garden, and even a meadow. Though the living quarters were not luxurious, they were comfortable at least by eighteenth–century standards. Emanuel’s father appears to have earned a fairly good living, although harness making was never a way to riches. It was not as prosperous a trade as that of the butchers and bakers, for instance, but it supported a family well. Immanuel’s father may have employed an apprentice or a journeyman at times, although it would not have been unusual had he worked mostly by himself.

The Kant’s almost certainly had at least one maidservant, who also would have lived in the house. The young Emanuel was constantly confronted with his father’s business. Immanuel was the fourth child of the Kant’s, but when he was born his only surviving sibling was a five-year-old sister. At his baptism, Anna Regina wrote in her prayer book: “May God sustain him in accordance with His Covenant of Grace until his final rest, for the sake of Jesus Christ, Amen.”Given that she had already lost two children, the name of the new son appeared most auspicious to her as well. It answered a real concern and expressed a heartfelt sentiment. It was not just a pious wish. Indeed, Immanuel’s chances of living to a ripe old age were not very good. Of the five siblings born after Kant, only three (two sisters and one brother) survived early childhood. In other words, four of the nine children born in the Kant household died at an early age. While this was not unusual in the eighteenth century, it could not have been easy for Emanuel’s mother. While the Kant family lived fairly well during Emanuel’s early childhood, the situation worsened as he grew older.

On March 1, 1729, his grandfather died. It appears that, as a result, Johann Georg Kant also took charge of the business of his father-in-law. He was now the only provider for his mother in-law as well. He found this difficult to manage. Four years later (in 1733) the entire family moved out of the home they had occupied until then into the house of the grandmother – probably to be able to take better care of her. The new house, a smaller, more modest, one-story dwelling, also located in the outer city, provided cramped quarters for the growing family.

The new business location was not as profitable as the old. Though Immanuel’s father had never had a large business, his income declined steadily. The two most important reasons for this were increased competition from the nearby shops of the saddle makers and the increasing age of the father. The first was not just a consequence of the new location, but also a direct result of the serious crisis that the guild system underwent during the early years of the eighteenth century. Though the guild system remained powerful, it had deep problems. This is shown by the “Opinion of the Imperial Diet Concerning the Abuses of the Guilds” from August 14, 1731, which was meant to curb these abuses. Guilds were quarreling with one another, and journeyman and masters did not get along as well as they had before. The edict took away some of the rights of the guilds and curbed others, enjoining them to become more sedate in their ways, showing due obedience to their appointed [civil] authorities.

The Kant family was affected by such quarrels, but Johann Georg and Anna Regina proved themselves to be good people in the eyes of their son: I still remember ... how the Harness makers and the Saddle makers once had a dispute about the business they had in common (Gemeinsame) because of which my father suffered greatly. Yet in spite of this, my parents dealt with such respect and love with their enemies and with such a firm trust in their destiny (Vorsehung) that the memory of this will never leave me, even though I was just a boy then.

In competing for a limited business, the saddle makers encroached on the market of the harness makers, who fought this encroachment but ultimately lost. In some regions of Germany the trade of the harness makers had already disappeared by the time Kant was born. Johann Georg Kant lived and worked during the period in which this trade declined in Königsberg. His business suffered as time went on, and it became increasingly difficult to make a living during the 1730s and 1740s. Johann Georg must have known he was facing a losing battle. He must have felt that the encroachment was unfair, even if he could not change it. Still, he did not allow these troubles to poison his family life, even though family and business were so closely intertwined.

The daily food of the Kant family was probably as monotonous as this account suggests, and frugal at the best of times. Nevertheless, it would not have been unusual for small tradesmen of the period, and it would be wrong to say that the Kant’s were poor – at least as long as the mother was alive. Johann Georg and Anna Regina Kant were good parents. They cared for their children as well as they could. In fact, if we know one thing about Kant’s youth, it is that he led a protected life. One of his closest colleagues reported later:

“Kant told me that when he more closely observed the education in the household of a count not far from Königsberg ... he often thought of the incomparably more noble education that he had received in the house of his parents. He was grateful to them, saying that he had never heard or seen anything indecent at home.”

This testimony is supported by Borowski, who wrote: How often have I heard him say: “Never, not even once, was I allowed to hear anything indecent from my parents, or to see something dishonorable.” He himself admitted that there are perhaps only a few children – especially in our age – who can look back to their childhood with such gratification as he always could and still does.

Indeed, Kant had only good things to say about his parents. Thus he wrote in a letter late in life “my two parents (from the class of tradesmen) were perfectly honest, morally decent, and orderly. They did not leave me a fortune (but neither did they leave me any debts). Moreover, they gave me an education that could not have been better when considered from the moral point of view. Every time I think of this I am touched by feelings of the highest gratitude.” When Johann Georg died in 1746, Emanuel, the oldest son – then almost twenty–two years of age – wrote in the family Bible: “On the 24th of March my dear father was taken away by a happy death.... May God, who did not grant him many joys in this life, permit him to share in the eternal joy?”

We may assume that Kant respected and loved his father: much of his stern moral outlook can probably be traced back to this hard–working man who worked out a living for his family under circumstances that were not always easy. His mother may have meant even more to him. But he spoke of her in more sentimental terms. Thus he is reported to have said:

“I will never forget my mother, for she implanted and nurtured in me the first germ of goodness; she opened my heart to the impressions of nature; she awakened and furthered my concepts, and her doctrines have had a continual and beneficial influence in my life.” She was “a woman of great and natural understanding... who had a noble heart, and possessed a genuine religiosity that was not in the least enthusiastic.”

Kant believed not only that he had inherited his physical looks from his mother, but also that she had been most important for the first formation of his character, as well as for having laid the foundation for what he later became. He was very dear to her, and he felt favored. In his lectures on anthropology, we find him saying that it is usually the fathers who spoil their daughters and the mothers who spoil their sons, and that mothers will prefer sons who are lively and bold.

Yet he also said that sons usually love their fathers more than their mothers, because children, if they have not yet been spoiled, really love pleasures that are connected with toils. ... In general, mothers spoil... their children. Yet we find that the children – especially sons – love their fathers more than their mothers. This results from the fact that the mothers do not allow them to jump and run, etc. because they are afraid they might hurt themselves. The father, who yells at them, and perhaps also spanks them when they are unruly, also leads them at times into the fields where they can behave like boys and allows them to run around, play and be happy. While this is not necessarily an account of his own relation to mother and father, there is every reason to believe that he loved them both, if perhaps in different ways. Immanuel’s mother was better educated than most women in the eighteenth century. She wrote well. Indeed, she appears to have taken care of most writing in the family. She took him out on walks, “called his attention to objects of nature and many of its appearances, even told him what she knew of the nature of the sky, and admired his keen understanding and his advanced comprehension.”

His grandmother died in 1735. Sad as this event must have been, it may have made things easier. There was one less mouth to feed, less work for the mother, and more room for the children. In November of the same year, Anna Regina gave birth to another child, a son (Johann Heinrich). Two years later (on December 18, 1737), she died at the age of forty, worn out by nine pregnancies and the strain of taking care of her family.

As Immanuel was just thirteen when his mother died, her death affected him greatly. He is reported to have given in old age the following account of his mother’s death: [She] had a friend, whom she loved dearly. Her friend was engaged to a man to whom she had given her whole heart, without violating her innocence and virtue. Though the man had promised to marry her, he broke his promise and married someone else. As a consequence of the pain and suffering, the deceived woman came down with a deadly high fever. She refused to take the medicine prescribed for her. Kant’s mother, who nursed her on her deathbed, tried to give her a full spoon of the medicine; but her sick friend refused it, claiming it had a disgusting taste. Kant’s mother believed that the best way to convince her of the contrary would be to take a spoonful herself.

The death of his mother cannot have been easy for a thirteen–year-old, but it does not explain his later philosophical development. Anna Regina was buried “silently” and “poor,” meaning that she was buried without a procession and at a price that people of modest means could afford. For the purposes of taxation the Kant household had been explicitly declared “poor” in 1740. Given this decline, it is not surprising that the family received assistance from other family members and friends. Thus, they got firewood from some benefactors, and Emanuel’s studies were supported by an uncle (a brother of his mother, a shoemaker by trade) who was better off than Kant’s father.

Later, by the time Kant was a famous philosopher, some people tried to argue that the Kant family was destitute, but that never appears to have been the case. Wasianski found it necessary to address the topic, saying that Kant’s “parents were not rich, but not at all so poor that they had to suffer any need; much less [is it true] that they were destitute or had to worry about food. They earned enough to take care of their household and the education of their children.” He also pointed out that, though they received help from others, it was not very significant. While there was no “social safety net” in today’s sense of the term, the extended family looked out for its members and provided what was necessary.

Kant did not have much in common with his brother and sisters. He was not very close to any of them. When, during the very last days of his life, his sister Katharina Barbara came to nurse him, he was embarrassed by her “simplicity,” even though he was also grateful. With his only surviving brother, Johann Heinrich, who was born while Kant was already attending the Collegium Fridericianum, he did not have much of a relationship either. He hardly found time to answer his letters. This does not mean that he did not scrupulously fulfill what he took to be his duties toward them. Indeed, it is clear that he supported them when they were in need. Even if he remained a loof, he never neglected his obligations to his family.

Kant’s parents were religious. They were deeply influenced by Pietism, especially his mother, who followed the Pietistic beliefs and practices then current in the circles of tradesmen and the less educated townspeople in Königsberg. Pietism was a religious movement within the Protestant churches of Germany. It was to a large extent a reaction to the formalism of Protestant orthodoxy. Orthodox theologians and pastors placed great emphasis on the so-called symbolic books, and they required strict verbal adherence to their teaching. Anyone disagreeing with the traditional theological doctrines was harassed and persecuted. At the same time, they were not overly interested in the spiritual or economic well-being of their flock. Most of them had made comfortable arrangements with the local gentry, and they were often disdainful of the simpler and less educated people of the city. The Pietists, by contrast, emphasized the importance of independent Bible study, personal devotion, the priesthood of the laity, and a practical faith issuing in acts of charity. Pietism was an evangelical movement, and it usually involved an insistence on a personal experience of radical conversion or rebirth, and an abrogation of worldly success.

The fact that Emanuel grew up in this religious environment certainly had consequences for his intellectual development, though it is difficult to determine how far these went. Emanuel’s religious background was fought with deep ambiguities, having a component that was seen elsewhere as contrary to the basic tenets of true faith. If Pietistic ideas had an influence on Kant very early on, they were those mediated by Schulz. It was the Pietism in Königsberg that confronted the young Kant, and not some other kind. His mother’s outlook, which was described by Kant himself as “genuine religiosity that was not at all enthusiastic,” has Schulzian traits. Still, it is unlikely that Pietism had any fundamental and lasting influence on Kant’s philosophy.

It is even doubtful that the Pietism of his parents left any significant traces on Kant’s intellectual outlook, even if Kant’s earliest biographers suggest that it did. They were in no better position to make this claim than we would be today. Borowski claimed that Kant’s “father insisted on industriousness and thorough honesty in his son, while the mother also demanded piety in him in accordance with the ideas (Schema) she had formed of it. The father demanded work and sincerity – the mother demanded holiness as well.” Borowski further observed that Kant “enjoyed the supervision of his parents long enough to be able to judge correctly about the entirety of their way of thinking (Denkart)” and that “the demand for holiness” found in Kant’s second Critique was identical to his own mother’s demands during his earliest years. In a similar vein, Rink quoted Kant as having said of his parents: Even if the religious views of that time ... and the concepts of what was called virtue and piety were anything but clear and sufficient, the people actually were virtuous and pious.

The comments attributed to Kant show that he respected his parents and others who practiced Pietistic customs. They also show that Kant believed that his mother positively influenced his moral outlook. Yet this is far from showing that Kant’s mature view was in any way close to Pietism. It may indeed be true that Kant “enjoyed the supervision of his parents long enough to be able to judge correctly about the entirety of their way of thinking,” but this does not mean that he himself learned their way of thinking as a consciously formulated doctrine. If anything, the passages make clear that the mature Kant did not think that there was much of a doctrine at all behind the conduct of these virtuous and pious people. He appreciated them for their actions, not for their theological theories. To claim on the basis of such slender evidence that a “vital key to understanding Kant’s views is the fact that his parents were both members of the Pietists church” is consequently misleading.

Kant gave us several clues about what he learned from his parents. He asserted late in his life that the education he received from them “could not have been better when considered from the moral point of view,” and throughout his life he remarked about the ideal early moral education. Therefore, it is perhaps best to listen to Kant on what the best moral education of young children involves, and to take this as a clue to what he learned from his own parents. A certain dignity that a human being possesses in his inner nature, which gives him dignity compared with all the other creatures. His duty is not to deny this dignity of humanity in his own person.

As Kant viewed the drift of scientific thought, he saw in it an attempt to include all of reality, including human nature, in its mechanical model. This would mean that all events, being parts of a unified mechanism, could be explained in terms of cause and effect. Moreover, this scientific approach would eliminate from consideration any elements that could not fit into its method. Kant was impressed by the obvious success and the constant advance of scientific knowledge. What the success of Newtonian physics did for Kant was to raise some serious questions about the adequacy of the philosophy of his day. Rationalism could not produce the kind of knowledge Newtonian physics represented, and for this reason its metaphysical speculations about reality beyond experience were considered dogmatic.

The life of Kant was influence by the philosophy of Christian Wolff and Leibniz. The contrast between rationalism and science raised for Kant the question of whether metaphysics can increase our knowledge the way science obviously can. The dogmatic character of metaphysicians had come in their systems of thought, as shown by the differences between Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz. He thus says, “The genuine method of metaphysics is fundamentally the same kind which Newton introduced into natural science and which was there so fruitful.” With this interpretation of scientific and moral thought, Kant provided a new function and a new life for philosophy. To achieve this new philosophy, Kant came up with what he called Copernican revolution in philosophy which is found in his major work, the critique of pure reason.

3.2 Kant’s morality

Duty base is the central work of Kant’s morality and there is know how one can talk about Kant’s ethics or morals without Cicero. What was to be a mere textbook treatment of well-rehearsed issues became a much more programmatic treatise. It is therefore no accident that the terminology of the Groundwork is so similar to that of Cicero – “will,” “dignity,” “autonomy,” “duty,”“virtue,” “freedom,” and several other central concepts play similar foundational roles in Cicero and in Kant. There are large areas of agreement between Kant and Cicero. They both thought that ethics is based on reason and is opposed to impulse, and they both rejected hedonism. Cicero used such phrases as “conquered by pleasure” and “broken by desires” to describe actions that fall short of virtue and moral character, while Kant argued that only actions done from duty alone were moral, while any action motivated by pleasure was non-moral. Both Cicero and Kant offer a duty-based theory of morality.

Though Cicero, like Kant, considered duty and virtue to be the fundamental concepts of morality, Cicero opted for a form of eudemonism, which held that whatever is in accordance with duty will also turn out to be ultimately more pleasant than what is in contradiction to virtue. Ultimately, duty, like all things, derives from nature:

From the beginning nature has assigned to every type of creature the tendency to preserve itself, life and body, and to reject anything that seems likely to harm them, seeking and procuring everything necessary for life, such as nourishment, shelter and so on. Common also to all animals is the impulse to unite for the purpose of procreation, and a certain care for those that are born.

Duties are based ultimately on these tendencies. Dutiful actions may therefore be characterized as “following nature.” What is our duty is also what is natural, and Cicero’s claim that we should follow nature is perhaps the most famous precept of his moral philosophy. Cicero did not derive his duties from nature in any straightforward way. First of all, nature has given reason to human beings, and reason is their essential character. Therefore, duties are based on reason as well. So, for Cicero there could be no conflict between following nature and following reason. What is truly rational is also natural. Secondly, nature, “by the power of reason, unites one man to another for the fellowship both of common speech and life.”

We are social animals, who need others not just for the necessities of life, but also for company and for flourishing. We need the approval of others, and the moral life is fundamentally concerned with such approval. We do not want just to be seen as good or honorable, we also want to be good or honorable. Accordingly, the duties must be derived from the fundamental “sources of honorableness.” There were four such sources for Cicero: (1) perception of truth (ingenuity), (2) preserving fellowship among men, (3) greatness and strength of a lofty and unconquered spirit, (4)order and limit in everything that is said or done (modesty, restraint). These four sources seem to him “bound together and interwoven.”

Most duties have their origin in all of them, though some may be traced to just one of these sources. Much of Book I of On Duties is taken up with the attempt to show “how duties have their roots in the different elements of what is honorable.” Duties dealing with the “communal life” influence all the others. The “duties that have their roots in sociability conform more to nature than those drawn from learning.” Therefore, he examines more thoroughly “what are the natural principles of human fellowship and community.”

Duties having to do with our sociability take precedence over some of the other duties: such as devotion to learning. For instance, As Cicero puts it in Book I, “Let the following, then, be regarded as settled: when choosing between duties, the chief place is accorded to the class of duties grounded in human fellowship.” The other sources of honorableness are really closely related to the second. Thus loftiness of spirit reveals itself only in a fight for “common safety.” It cannot be exhibited in a fight for one’s own advantage. Modesty, restraint, or what is “seemly” is at least in part bound up with one’s social role. We are social animals, and ethics is the study of ourselves within society. Cicero differentiates between things that are proper for us to do because of our universal nature or because of the characteristics we share with everyone, and those that we must do because we are the individuals we are.

Each person should hold on to what is his as far as it is not vicious, but is peculiar to him, so that the seemliness that we are seeking might more easily be maintained. For we must act in such a way that we attempt nothing contrary to universal nature; but while conserving that, let us follow our own nature, so that even if other pursuits may be weightier and better, we should measure our own by the rule of our own nature. For it is appropriate neither to fight against nature nor to pursue anything that can’t do, do you attain.

As the son of a master artisan who was an important member of a guild, Kant had directly experienced the kind of moral disposition or ethos that Cicero and Garve were talking about. Indeed, it always remained an important notion for him. Yet it was not fundamental to morality. Honorableness or Ehrbarkeit was for Kant a merely external form of morality, or an honestas externa. He realized clearly that it depended on the social order, and for this very reason he rejected it as the basis for our maxims. The ground of moral obligation, he says, must not be found “in the nature of man nor in the circumstances in which man is placed, but must be sought a priori solely in the concepts of pure reason.” “Honor” and “honorable” could therefore not possibly capture the true nature of morality.

In rejecting “honor,” Kant also implicitly rejects one of the fundamental principles of the society he lives in. The distinction of different estates has no moral relevance. As moral agents we are all equal. Any attempt to defend or justify social differences by appealing to morals must be rejected as well. Frederick had claimed that:

“A true prince exists only to work and not to enjoy himself. He must be dominated by the feeling of patriotism, and the only goal to which he aspires must be: to achieve great and benevolent measures of the welfare of his state. To this goal he must subordinate all personal considerations, his self-love as well as his passions... Justice must always be the primary concern of the prince; while the welfare of his people must have precedence over every other interest. The ruler is far from being the arbitrary master of his people; he is indeed, nothing other than its first servant.”

In the critique of pure reason Kant uncovered the principle of reason that gives us knowledge of the world of experience. Persons feel the pull of “the moral law within,” a governing principle that differs from those that explain the behavior of natural object. To make his foundational philosophy complete, therefore, Kant came out with several works on ethics a few years after he published his first Critique. Of these, the two most important are the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) and the Critique of Practical Reason (1787). The Kant moral philosophy became the most important contributions to the history of thought.

The most important aspect of an action from the moral view point is the intention. The intention of an action is the anticipated result of the action as foreseen and willed by the agent. A major test of a morally good act is, therefore, whether its principle can be applied to all rational beings and applied consistently. And Kant opines that “moral philosophy is the quest for these principles that apply to all rational beings and that lead to behavior that we call good.” Accordingly, Kant’s chief point is that the essence of the morally good act is the principle that a person affirms when he wills an act: “the good will is good not because of what it causes or accomplishes, not because of its usefulness in the attainment of some set purpose, but alone because of the thing, that is to say, it is good of itself.”

A rational being strives to do what he or she ought to do, and this distinguishes from an act that a person does either from inclination or from interest. Kant says, if we all compare the different in these motives, for to act either inclination or self-interest appears to us to be on a different level from acting out of duty to the moral law. Kant base human act on duty, all what man does should come from duty. That is duty; for duty sake, morality therefore, is base on our action as a person and that is why in Nigeria today, Kant is going to educate those in public office how to perform their duties in line with morals that does not emanate from inclination and self-interest. Kant makes the rather startling moment that the “good will is good not because of what it accomplishes.”

Duty implies that we are under some kind of obligation, a moral law. Kant says that as rational beings we are aware of this obligation as it compares us in form of imperative. Not all imperatives or commands are connect with morality, for they are not in any case directed to all people, and, therefore, they lack the quality of universality that a moral rule requires. If the morally good will is one that performs actions out of a sense of duty and duty is conformity to the moral law, then how do I determine what is the moral law? Without an answer to this question, the good will would be well intentioned but morally blind. A moral law is a rule for guiding behavior. Kant morality move forward to establish what he refers as the imperative, and also distinguish it into two imperatives which are hypothetical and categorical imperatives.

Hypothetical Imperative

This is an action that compares us to do X if we need Y, we cannot use this to justify the public morality in Nigeria because it encourage what this topic arm to fight against. This morality that demands that I should do A because I need B will affect the morality of the nation, because many are ready to bribe their way into public office. According to Stumpf, Kant refers to this imperative as technical or prudential, which is morally responsible that we must do a certain thing to be firm and Stumpf opines “if we want to build bridge across the river, we must use materials of certain strength.” This seminar work is more concerned with that of categorical because that is what Kant refers as the principle to measure morality and which also commands duty base ethics.

Categorical Imperative

Kant begins by saying, that it is categorical imperative because it applied to all people and commands “an action as necessary of itself which reference to another end, that is, as objectively necessary.” Kant who say that categorical imperative is the conception of law that enable us to act according to nature as it pertains to human behavior, and it expresses the concept of duty in an alternative way, namely, “Act as if the maxim of your action were to become a universal law of nature” Thus the analytic explicates first the central issues of the Groundwork, that is, the notions of a categorical imperative, freedom, and autonomy. It then goes on to deduce the principles of pure practical reason, that is, the moral law as “a law of causality through freedom and hence a law of the possibility of supersensible nature.” In a famous passage Kant says:

Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and reverence the more often and more steadily one reflects on them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me. I do not need to search for them and merely conjecture them as though they were veiled in obscurity or in the transcendent region beyond my horizon; I see them before me and connect them immediately with the consciousness of my existence.

Immanuel Kant's idea of morality is rooted in the concept of duty and the categorical imperative. Kant argues that moral actions are those performed out of a sense of duty, guided by reason, rather than by personal desires or consequences. He believes that morality is not subjective but universal, meaning that moral laws must apply to all rational beings, regardless of context or individual circumstances. The categorical imperative is central to Kant's ethical theory. It dictates that we should act only according to maxims that we can consistently will to be a universal law. In other words, before acting, one should ask whether the action could be applied universally, without contradiction. For example, lying is morally wrong because, if everyone lied, trust and communication would be impossible, thus negating the very purpose of lying. Kant also emphasizes respect for persons. He argues that humans should never be treated merely as a means to an end, but always as ends in themselves, deserving of dignity and respect. Kant's ethics stress that moral principles are grounded in rationality and the inherent worth of each person, making his approach deontological, meaning that the morality of an action depends on whether it follows rules, rather than on its consequences.

Kant’s Duty

Although already emphasis but it is good to note that Kant’s morality home his concept of duty. According to Omoregbe, “duty is what a person has an obligation to do. In other words, a duty is what a person ought to do, what he is obliged to do” . Just as the concept of morality presupposes society so does the concept of duty presupposes society. The moral law of Kant forbids any man to be used simply as means to an end. This nature of Kant as Omoregbe put it, conflict that of Kant Marx’s that man should exploit his fellow man. And he avers, “It is an offence against human dignity to use a human being simply as an instrument to attain one’s ends”. Kant’s duty did not just only focus on the exploitation of man as wrong or go against his morality also he affirm, “the man who commits suicide in order to get out of frustration also uses humanity (in his own person) simply as a means to an end”. So the generality of what Kant morality or his duty is that one must act according to maxims that are universal.

For the survival of man in a society, he needs others and that is the affirmation that “man is a social animal” according to Omoregbe’s sense of duty, the division of labour in the society is meant to make life better for people. Therefore when people do their work promptly and properly other people benefit from it and it makes life better for them. Neglect of one duty makes life difficult for others, and Omoregbe opines; “we are interdependent in the society that what we do affect others. A person who has no sense of duty and frequently fails to do his duty is a person who persistently makes other people suffer and makes life difficult for them.” Kant postulates three moralities; which he says they cannot be proved by any rational argument but rather they are postulates of practical reason which are assumption of morality and they are: the immortality of the soul, the freedom of the will and the existence of God.

The assumption of these postulation are as a result of man’s moral obligation that conform his will into moral law, and morality leads us to assume that the soul survival death, that man’s will is free, and that God exists. According to Kant, the complete conformity of the will with the moral law is holiness, and holiness is a perfection which no human being ever attains in this life. Because man is not capable of attaining the ideal holiness through his earthly existence, Kant affirms that man has an obligation to strive for it. Again, morality therefore leads us to assume the immortality of the soul, for this is presupposed by the imperative of the moral law which obliges man to strive for holiness. The progress towards holiness is, according to Kant, an infinite progress which cannot cease with death.

This infinite progress is possible, however, only under the presupposition of an infinitely enduring existence and personality of the same rational being; this is called the immortality of the soul.

The obligation of man also conform him to promote the highest good and Kant avers that the highest good is holiness. Accordingly, Omoregbe opines, “it is the complete conformity of the will with the moral law and the happiness that is proportionate to such conformity”. Because man does not have right over nature and therefore cannot ensure that holiness is accompanied with proportionate happiness and Kant affirm;

Not being nature’s cause, his will cannot by its own strength bring nature, as it touches on his happiness, into complete harmony with his practical principles……therefore also, the existence is postulated of a cause of the whole of nature, itself distinct from nature, which contain the ground of the exact coincidence of happiness with morality.

The existence of God is of necessary because since man must be rewarded with happiness for being morally and man lacks power to reward himself, therefore, Kant concludes “it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God”. Morality has given us the power to assume the immortality of the soul, the freedom of the will, and the existence of God. Morality, according Kant, is autonomous; it neither presupposes religion nor does it need religion.

Man’s duty or public morality does not depends on religion, in respective of one’s religion, morality is a requirement of doing good and this good, as Kant says, it must conform with universal maxims. Morality is not based on religion or on the command of God. Omoregbe conclude by saying, “the moral law is a self-imposed law of the autonomous will of man”. There is no authentic way of honouring God apart from a moral way of life and morality is the yardstick for distinguishing true and false religion. Of course, Kant has made perfectly clear that morality is rational and autonomous and does not depend on divine commands for its authority. Morality is therefore a core value on which every individual should act upon and man’s duty does not depends on religion or any other super-power but rather on man’s moral value, that all man should hold firmly to himself and reflect when servicing in the public sector.

Critique of practical reason (124-125). P.129

Critique of practical reason (124-125). P.130

Joseph Omoregbe. 1993. Ethics: A Systematic and historical study. P. 228

Joseph Omoregbe. 1993. Ethics: A Systematic and historical study. P. 228

William F. Lawhead. 2002. The Voyage of Discovery. Ch. P. 345

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